Women: They're Changing Laws . . . and Law Schools

By ELLEN O'NEIL
New York News Service

In a recent welfare rights case, argued before the New Jersey Supreme Court, the three attorneys representing the appellant, the State, and a friend of the court (amicus curiae) were all women.

"There they were, seven men; there we were, three women," comments Nadine Taub, one of the three, and a Rutgers Law School associate professor. The justices were struck by seeing us. They even remarked on the oddity — three women lawyers."

Ms. Taub was not amused. She felt moved to ask the Court about the nature of oddity. "I asked them why they never thought it odd before that all attorneys were men."

At 31, Professor Taub, and other young woman lawyers, finds some constant problems in court, "one of which," she says, "is to make the judge realize you are not a cute little girl. My style is straight and hard, yet every time I go before a new judge, I go through the hurdle of establishing the fact that I'm serious and competent."



New York Daily News

Nadine Taub is a lawyer, not a cute little girl

Dramatic Change

The hurdles set before women lawyers are lower these days. As a result, women are pouring into law schools, a dramatic change which began toward the end of the '60s when men stopped using law schools as an escape route from the draft, and women started to use them as one of the best routes toward effective social change. Between 1970 and 1972, the number of women increased by 300 percent.

At Rutgers Law School in Newark, women account for approximately 40 percent of the enrollment. Of last year's 630 students, 380 were men, 250 women. Next year's crop of 700 should reflect the same ratio, according to Lee Smith, assistant dean at Newark and director of admissions.

The Camden, N. J., branch of the Law School expects about 55 women out of its Fall class of 198 — but an official at the school says she's "a bit disappointed" with that ratio because the school's top students in recent years have been women.

In the 1974 class, the top two students were women. In the 1976 class — students who have just finished their first year — the top two students again were women.

And for the past two years, the school's Law Journal elected a woman as editor-in-chief.

"Women's perceptions of law as a viable career choice," is only part of the picture of leaping enrollments, says Smith. But Rutgers maintains a leadership role in attracting women because its law school, through its clinical law program, has won major anti-discrimination and civil rights cases, such as securing a U.S. Supreme Court ruling which declared wire tapping for national security purposes unconstitutional.

"We have a good reputation in the women's movement as a place where women can be treated on their merits," adds the dean. "Rutgers also has six women faculty members, which is practically unheard of in a law school. Cornell, for example, has just hired its first full-time woman ever."

New Kinds of Lawyers

Among the women law students at Rutgers there is a basic commitment to the law as a vehicle for the redistribution of power and as an effective way of representing the under-represented. They really mean it when they talk about de-mystifying the legal system, and becoming new kinds of lawyers who don't see the lawyer-client relationship as a power game.

"When I entered the Yale Law School in 1965, I thought of the law as an intellectually interesting way of doing something for people," says Professor Taub. "Now I see, given who I am, it is the way to make a contribution to what needs to be done — redistribute power."

Nadine Taub joined the law faculty a year ago, coming from the American Civil Liberties Union to teach and to direct the Women's Rights Litigation Clinic, one of eight Rutgers' courses in which students actually get a chance to do what a lawyer does.

Rutgers has played a pioneering role in clinical education with its programs in constitutional litigation, consumer protection, prison law, legal rights of the mentally disabled, health law and legislative services, a research service.

Traditionally, law students gained first-hand experience by working in a law firm during the summer where they are welcomed as the cheapest form of labor. "The advantage of a clinic," says Ms. Taub, "is that the work is part of the educational process and instead of getting to work on a bit or piece of a case, the students get a sense of long range strategy. They see the legal case as a campaign. And since the law moves slowly, they also have an opportunity to work on different stages of several cases."

The clinic is actually a small law firm. Ms. Taub is the senior partner and the attorney of record; it is she who goes into court on behalf of the clients, and the students who help prepare all pre-trial work: writing briefs, interviewing clients, investigating facts. They are the junior associates. The school pays for the clinic staff, but litigation expenses are paid by the clients. The public defender or the court may also request a clinic's services.

Woman's View

"My students also write memorandums on pending legislation such as day care, divorce, welfare payments and abortion," says Ms. Taub, "so they get to see that all law isn't a matter of going to court." Since most of her students are women, they evaluate these laws from a woman's point of view as well.

In June, attorney Taub went into the Superior Court in Bridgeton, N. J., for a week of hearings on behalf of two women and two doctors in a suit filed by the American Civil Liberties Union which seeks to compel three non-profit private hospitals (Bridgeton Hospital Association, the Salem Hospital and the Newcomb Hospital) to perform elective abortions.

The briefs and arguments which claimed the hospitals were denying the women their fundamental personal rights respecting privacy and control over their own bodies — rights decided when the U. S. Supreme Court declared New Jersey's abortion law unconstitutional — were prepared by the Women's Rights Litigation Clinic. It is a complicated case involving the responsibilities of private non-profit institutions that receive government funds and are closely regulated by state agencies to act as they see fit.

The Women's Right Litigation Clinic — which continues through the summer, paying its students — is also involved in asking for damages from the Newark Police on behalf of a woman who was jailed when she complained she was raped, in violation, says the clinic, of her constitutional right of due process.

Right to Maiden Name

A woman who was denied the right to resume her maiden name in a divorce proceeding is also being represented by the clinic on the grounds that she was denied equal protection under the law. "In New Jersey," says Ms. Taub, "you can take whatever name you want." Ms. Taub, who lives in Manhattan and is married to a Swedish mathematician, Olof Widlund, says she never changed her own name because she saw no reason to change it. "I'm my own person and I don't want to be introduced as just an appendage of my husband."

A woman whose seriousness is written all over her, Ms. Taub has long, dark brown hair, large dark brown eyes and wears a miniskirt peasant dress with the distracted air of one covered by a scholar's gown. In short culottes or floor-length dimity, her students follow suit — bluestockings all.

But it's not their garb or their sex that has changed the face of the law school. According to Professor Frank Askin, an associated dean and a senior partner of the school's prestigious Constitutional Litigation Clinic, "the women have, in the sense that they are morally committed to social change, increased the whole tone and intellectual character of the school.

"The women have made a very conscious decision to enter law school after they have worked or had children. For them it is not a logical extension of a college education. Probably as more and more women enter law school straight from college, they will be indistinguishable from the men, but not now."

2 Dozen 'Rosies' Rivet Down Pension Credits, Back Pay

By PHILIP WECHSLER

Two dozen "Rosie the Riveters" —the women who exchanged their kitchen aprons for factory coveralls to help turn out America's arsenal during World War II — have won a lengthy legal battle in Newark Federal Court to regain back pay and pension credits.

The women were among 300 female factory workers who were laid off in 1970 from the American Can Co. plant in Jersey City.

40G in Back Pay

They filed a class-action suit accusing the company of sex discrimination because they were dismissed while male workers with less seniority were kept on the job.

Nine of the women have received a total of $40,000 in back pay plus pension credits from their union, the United Steelworkers of America Local 6300, which was a co-defendant in the case. Negotiations are beginning to reimburse the other 15 women.

"When we were needed during the war it was okay for us to work the night shift, but when things slowed down we couldn't work nights," declared Angela Orlando, who spearheaded the fight for the dismissed women.

Lugging Those Shells

Mrs. Orlando, 66, who still lives in Jersey City, has bitter-sweet memories of working in the factory, where she was a machine operator on a production line turning out 80-pound canisters to hold dynamite.

"I stood on my feet all night, lugging those shells," she recalled. "And we rarely had coffee breaks. After work, which was usually one or two in the morning, I had to walk home."

"In those days the buses stopped running at midnight. I had to walk 10 blocks in the dark because the street lights were dimmed because of the blackout during the war."

"We never complained because we all believed it was our duty to support the war effort," she said.

A co-worker who joined the legal action was Mary Tibbs, a 54-year-old grandmother. As a young woman during the war, Mrs. Tibbs left her family's farm in South Carolina to head north for a job in the factory.

Remembers the Sprains

"I was a jack-of-all trades worker on the assembly line," she recalled. "Mostly I remember the constant muscle sprains I got from lifting these 50-pound packages of lids used to cover oil cans."

She also remembers her pay then—48 cents an hour.

Mrs. Orlando and Mrs. Tibbs along with literally millions of other American women were all dubbed "Rosie the Riveter" because they were doing jobs—manual and machine work—that were then considered the sole province of men. The men, of course, left the factories for the Armed Forces.

At the time, New Jersey had a law that prohibited women from working past midnight. It was a protective measure. But exemptions were granted, based on wartime needs.

During the great consumer boom of the '50s and '60s after the war, the women continued working, but on the day shift.

Then beginning in 1968, according to court documents, the company began phasing out the plant and the women volunteered to work nights to save their jobs. But American Can cited the state law.

The women urged both the company and the union to apply for an exemption, as was done during the war, but they were refused. The women accused the union of misleading them and then joining the company to save the jobs of [illegible] and not the women.

News photo by Pat Carroll

Nadine Taub (center), assistant professor at Rutgers Law School, researches the case of Angela Orlando (left) and Mary Tibbs.

In 1970, Mrs. Orlando read a newspaper article about the federal Civil Rights Act and decided to fight.

Ironically, shortly after Mrs. Orlando, Mrs. Tibbs and seven other women filed their class-action suit in 1971, the Legislature repealed the protective law. It had been challenged as unconstitutional and discriminatory toward women.

Rutgers Lawyer Helped

The nine women were represented by Nadine Taub, a lawyer with Rutgers University Women's Right Litigation Clinic, who negotiated the court approved settlement.

The federal court has sent out letters to the other 300 women who were laid off, but so far received only 15 replies. [illegible] of the women have apparently died or moved away from the area.

STATE & LOCAL

LAW SCHOOL'S PROGRAM 'UNIQUE'

'Big case' clinic a legal pacesetter

By PETER GENOVESE
Home News staff writer

NEWARK — Not only does Rutgers University Law School have the only "big case" constitutional law clinic among the nation's colleges, but it can also take credit for in inspiring the decade-long national debate over police surveillance of political activists, says clinic director Prof. Frank Askin.

The clinic's first case, back in 1969, was a challenge to a memo from the state Attorney General's Office directing state and local police departments to gather information on dissidents.

The clinic, under the sponsorship of the American Civil Liberties Union (Askin is one of the organization's four national general counsels), sued the state police in an effort to have any dissident files destroyed.

Although the clinic eventually lost, the action prompted similar lawsuits across the country and established the notion "that police are not supposed to monitor peoples' activities just because they don't like their politics," Askin says.

"That's been our greatest achievement, to have really initiated and inspired that entire challenge to police agencies," Askin says of the clinic, headquartered on the third floor of the law school at 15 Washington Street.

The clinic actually operates as a full-time law practice where "senior partners" — three faculty members — and "junior partners" — second and third-year law students — take on cases sponsored by organizations such as ACLU and the League of Women Voters.

Students work an average of 20 hours a week, and can earn up to 10 credits a year for their clinic time. The program, teachers and facilities are funded by the university; legal costs are picked up by the sponsoring organization.

Askin started the clinic 10 years ago "to give students experience in big case litigation." He says most clinical programs in the nation's law schools handle only "run of the mill" work — uncontested divorces and landlord-tenant disputes, for example.

"We concentrate on what are called frontier issues, where the law is just not clear," the Rutgers professor says. "Our clinic is really totally unique. There is none like ours."

This past school year was one of the busiest in the clinic's history. In fact, Askin says his students went through "a baptism of litigation fire."

The two most important cases, according to Askin, involved the scrutiny of mail by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the New Jersey State Police practice of randomly stopping cars on the highway.

In the first, Rutgers students and faculty obtained a nationwide federal court injunction prohibiting the FBI and the U.S. Postal Service from writing down the return addresses on letters sent to radical political groups.

The clinic entered the case of Lori Paton, of Chester, who filed suit against the FBI because the agency investigated her after she wrote a letter to the Socialist Workers Party as part of a high school project when she was 15.

More than a dozen Rutgers students researched and briefed the various issues involved, including whether a federal district court judge had the power to issue an order binding on federal officials across the country.

Their efforts paid off last November when U.S. District Court Judge Lawrence Whipple ruled that it was unconstitutional for the FBI and other investigative agencies to scrutinize mail for reasons of "national security."

The second major Rutgers victory, according to Askin, was the U.S. Supreme Court's decision last spring in Delaware vs. Prouse. The clinic had entered the case at the request of the ACLU, which took it to the nation's highest court with the Delaware Public Defender's Office.

The clinic had long been familiar with the issues involved in police searches of motorists. In 1971, it sued the New Jersey State Police, charging that officers were "hassling" long-haired motorists by making arbitrary license checks.

The clinic, as in the earlier challenge to state and local police surveillance of dissidents, lost its action. But the briefs filed by Rutgers students and faculty in the Delaware case, won by the ACLU and the state defender's office, "established for the first time the legal proposition that police cannot randomly search cars on the highway," Askin says.



FRANK ASKIN
...directs clinic

NADINE TAUB
...won landmark case

A third important case this past year involved another a group of Rutgers students, although not the constitutional litigation clinic directly. The Women's Rights Clinic, under the direction of Nadine Taub, carried out a successful challenge to the New Jersey statute denying Medicaid reimbursement for all abortions except those threatening the mother's life.

Taub, who two years ago won for a PSE&G stenographer what is considered one of the two landmark cases nationwide involving on-the-job sexual harassment, is one of several Rutgers faculty members working with clinic students. Others include Jonathan Hyman and Eric Neisser.

Not all of the clinic's cases deal with serious "frontier" issues. This past school year, students got a court order permitting a Little Leaguer to play in an all-star game after he was told he couldn't play because his hair was too long.

Cop lucky on draw

U.S. only industrial nation without parental leave laws

By NADINE TAUB
Special to The Los Angeles Times

RUTGERS, N.J. — The United States is the only industrialized nation without laws guaranteeing leave to care for a newborn child.

In 75 other countries, there are provisions for leaves with job guarantees, often with cash benefits. By contrast, one study finds that only about 50 percent of large U.S. companies even offer women an unpaid child-care leave. Still fewer men have the option of taking leave to care for a newborn.

The need for a nationwide parental-leave policy is obvious. As Rep. Patricia Schroeder, D-Colo., pointed out in a congressional hearing last fall, 96 percent of fathers and more than 60 percent of mothers work outside the home.

With children under 3

Women with children under the age of 3 make up the fastest-growing segment of the U.S. work force, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has reported, and almost half of women with children under 1 year old are working outside the home — as compared with 34 percent as recently as 1979.

A recent study by Catalyst, a national nonprofit organization, found that of 119 major corporations offering paternity leave, 41 percent said that it was not appropriate for a man to take any time off at the birth of a child.

All employers have been required since 1978, under terms of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, to treat women when disabled by pregnancy the same way as they treat other employees disabled by short-term illnesses and injuries. Under terms of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, employers offering child-rearing leave must make it available on a sex-neutral basis. However, only about half the companies surveyed allowed women to add to their disability period with an unpaid leave and a guaranteed job return.

Congress set

Congress next month will consider legislation to bring the United States into conformity with most industrialized nations. The Parental and Medical Leave Act, introduced by Rep. William D. Clay, D-Mo., would meet two important needs of today's workers.

Like a similar bill introduced last year by Schroeder, Clay's bill would guarantee employees their jobs or equivalent ones for up to 26 weeks a year of temporary medical leave and 18 weeks every two years of parental leave. The Clay legislation, however, meets the often-voiced concern for small employers by exempting those with fewer than five employees and includes an administrative as well as a judicial enforcement mechanism. The Senate is considering a nearly identical bill introduced by Sens. Christopher J. Dodd, D-Conn., and Arlen Specter, R-Pa.

Parental leave would include time off to care for newborns, newly adopted children and children who have serious health conditions. The Clay measure also calls for a commission to recommend — after no more than two years' study — legislation providing for paid leaves.

While medical leaves are necessary for the 85 percent of women workers who will bear children while employed, testimony at recent hearings on the House bill made plain that other workers need medical leaves too.

Needed therapy

A Vietnam veteran who earned three purple hearts told a subcommittee of suffering serious back injury. He needed post-surgery therapy and arranged to do his week's work at a federal agency in four 10-hour days. When a new supervisor found this unacceptable, it became clear that the veterans' ability to ensure satisfactory unpaid leave for medical reasons was not protected.

As a measure addressing the needs of women in the paid work force, Clay's bill has several strengths.

First, it is a vital step in accommodating the demands of family and work. As such, it is an important sequel to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and other anti-discrimination provisions which only require employers to be evenhanded in the benefits they choose to give.

Second, by sharply distinguishing needs associated with child rearing from those associated with child bearing, the bill clearly guarantees a father's right to child-care leaves, a right that has usually been invisible in "maternity leave" policies and programs.

Third, by treating temporary incapacities of pregnancy like other temporary incapacities, the Clay bill eliminates a source of resentment between workers who miss work for pregnancy-related reasons and workers who miss work for equally compelling problems. This approach also minimizes the chances that employers will perceive women of child-bearing age as potentially more expensive employees and therefore hesitate to hire them.

Bill may help

More generally, by encouraging people of both sexes to see similarities in their experiences, the bill may help to diffuse the view of women as mothers, and only mothers — a view that has tended to limit women's opportunities.

But the Clay bill has some serious shortcomings as well. The failure to provide for paid leaves means that leaves will not be a realistic option for low-income parents. Moreover, even where a family can afford the loss of one income, economic necessity means that most likely the woman's income is the one that will be lost, regardless of which parent most wants to engage in child care.

In the case of medical leaves, wage replacement often makes the difference between economic ruin and economic viability for families.

Another serious shortcoming is failure to provide leaves for the care of other relatives and dependents. Demographic trends make clear that the care needs of the elderly will far exceed those of small children. Current projections suggest that by 1990 there will be 19.2 million children under 5 years old as compared with 19.7 million people 65 and older who receive Medicare.

It is time that the United States, like the overwhelming majority of modern nations, recognizes and accommodates the human needs that compete with work. □

Nadine Taub is a professor of law at Rutgers Law School in Newark, N.J., where she also directs the Women's Rights Litigation Clinic.

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VIEWPOINTS

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CHILD CARE/U.S. should mandate leaves

By NADINE TAUB
The Los Angeles Times

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It is time that the United States, like the overwhelming majority of modern nations, recognizes and accommodates the human needs that compete with work.

Nadine Taub is a professor of law at Rutgers Law School in Newark, N.J., where she also directs the Women's Rights Litigation Clinic.

Unequal before the law

By Nadine Taub
Special to The Inquirer

The framers of the Constitution have sent us a mixed message about women; the relevance of the Bill of Rights for women is not clear-cut.

The Founding Fathers were privileged males who saw things in terms of their own situations. They were white property owners brought together by a desire to preserve their way of life and forge a nation.

But they also were men who spoke as "We, the people," and shaped a system for years to come, even though it was a product of the political, economic and social conditions of its times.

Understanding the original intent of the founders in shaping the new system is a matter of choosing between their specific intent and their broader vision.

Neither the original document nor the Bill of Rights guaranteed women basic political rights.

Despite some early voting by women in Virginia and New Jersey, there was no real question of women having the franchise, much less holding office, in the post-Revolutionary era.

The prevailing political theory and practice did not allow direct participation by women in political affairs. The appropriate outlet for women's political as well as productive and reproductive activities was the family, a social unit under male control.

The impact of this gendered view of the world extended well beyond the failure to afford women the political privileges afforded propertied white men. In articulating the basic freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights, the drafters were primarily concerned with activity in the public realm: that is, male activities in a male realm.

Nor were women included in the amendments that followed the Civil War.

One of the those amendments, the 14th, for the first time explicitly mentioned men, providing remedies only if male inhabitants were denied the vote.

Key post-Civil War Supreme Court cases confirmed women's exclusion from constitutional protection.

In 1873, the court ruled that the 14th Amendment did not guarantee women the right to become lawyers. In 1875, the court held that the amendment could not be used to override a Missouri law denying women suffrage.

Women were compelled half a century later to win their own amendment — the 19th — to gain even the vote.

The 19th Amendment's passage, however, did not mean that women were automatically accorded the rights and duties that generally accompanied elector status.

Women in the armed forces still are excluded from combat. As a result, women who wish to participate on an equal basis in the military cannot do so. Moreover, because the combat exclusion is used to justify an all-male draft registration system, women are denied the fundamental right of deciding whether to join or resist their country's military efforts.

Protections for reproductive freedom also have been slow to develop. Neither the Bill of Rights nor the 14th Amendment was seen initially as a source of protection for the right to make choices about reproduction.

In 1927, the Supreme Court refused to forbid the compulsory sterilization of a woman institutionalized for being an unmarried mother. In the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: "Three generations of imbeciles are enough."

The court did not recognize reproductive autonomy as a basic civil right and liberty until 1942, when it ruled, on equal protection grounds, that certain males convicted as felons could not be subjected to involuntary sterilization.

On the other hand, seeing developments that benefit women as separate from the original intent of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights ignores the broader principles incorporated in these documents and frustrates efforts to fulfill them.

A suffragette picketing the White House in 1917.

Women's rights have been slow in coming. And the relevance of the Bill of Rights is anything but clear-cut.

While the new system of government was created for the benefit of white men with property, the Constitution — like the Declaration of Independence before it — also reflected a revolutionary, egalitarian ideology.

An obvious expression of this broader purpose is the repeated reference to "the People" in the Constitution's preamble and throughout the amendments.

Two additional manifestations of the Constitution's egalitarian nature are its insistence that people — at least, white males — of all classes and interests be represented equally in all branches of government and its specific prohibition of establishment of a nobility.

To hold the framers to the narrow meaning of their specific provisions may do an injustice to the breadth of their vision, particularly in light of their desire to draft a document that would endure for the ages.

It was this broader sort of original intent, as amplified by the Civil War amendments and the movement for women's rights, that the court honored in 1971 when it invalidated a statute for the first time on the ground that it denied women equal protection under the 14th Amendment.

Since 1971, the Supreme Court has repeatedly invalidated sexually discriminatory legislation, clearly rejecting generalizations based on gender.

When it struck down in *Frontiero v. Richardson* (1973) the military's policy of denying benefits to certain male dependents of females in the Army while granting them to female dependents of males, the court expressly criticized the earlier "romantic paternalism" that "in practical effect put women not on a pedestal but in a cage."

As recently as 1982, in its *Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan* decision, the court struck down a prohibition on males becoming nursing students.

Justice Sandra Day O'Connor expressly noted for the court that the rule impermissibly perpetuated stereotyping in employment by reinforcing the view that nursing is an occupation for women, not men.

But the Supreme Court's development of equal protection guarantees for women has not entirely lived up to the promise of the 1970s.

Only those stereotypes that the court perceives as grossly inaccurate have been rejected.

In upholding the male-only draft, the court saw men and women as fundamentally different, even though that difference resulted from their different treatment under the laws governing combat and that different treatment, in turn, reflected an understanding about the proper social roles for the sexes, rather than the physical differences that are relevant today.

Ambivalence about the extent of guarantees and the nature of original intent is even more explicit in the area of reproductive freedom. In 1973, the court held in *Roe v. Wade* that the right to privacy encompassed the decision whether to terminate a pregnancy.

The court's 1989 decision in *Webster v. Reproductive Services*, however, marked a departure from this path.

While nominally upholding *Roe v. Wade*, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist's plurality opinion made clear that, at the very least, state restrictions on women's access to abortion would be subject to less rigorous scrutiny and more routinely upheld than previously.

The greater tolerance of abortion restrictions signaled by Rehnquist was borne out by the two 1990 decisions upholding laws requiring minors to make sure their parents know they are getting abortions.

An important undercurrent in these cases is the notion that the rights involved, whether articulated as procreative liberty or the right of women to full participation in society, are not explicitly protected by the original Constitution, the Bill of Rights or any subsequent amendment.

Not surprisingly, at a time when sex discrimination and reproductive constraints are being challenged under broad constitutional equality and privacy principles, the traditional protections of the Bill of Rights also have become increasingly important to women.

The nature of original intent is not merely a historical question. Choosing whether to focus on a broad or narrow meaning of original intent is inescapably a question of values.

It is no secret that, over the years, constitutional protections have been extended far beyond those specifically contemplated by the framers, whether we speak of particular guarantees or broader provisions.

Few question that changes reflect contemporary values as well as technological developments: The retrenchment that a return to original meaning in the narrow sense would entail can hardly be said to be neutral.

Simply put, it would be a conscious choice to disregard the contemporary consensus that calls for the inclusion of women in the equality guarantees and other protections that will allow them the individual autonomy and dignity allowed men. Time will tell whether the present court will heed that call.

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Q

- What does Taub mean by specific intent vs. broader vision?
- What is the "franchise" referred to in paragraph 6?
- What issues concerning women and the Bill of Rights are still being debated today?
- You are there: Imagine that you are living in 1873 or 1875. Take the role of the woman, one of the lawyers or the judge in one of the cases involving women's rights. Argue the case in class.